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LOOK AWAY DIXIELAND: THE SOUTH AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
Robin L. Einhorn 
ABSTRACT—Although it can seem paradoxical today that the federal 
government redistributes from “blue” states where majorities are tolerant of 
federal taxation to “red” states where they are hostile, the rhetoric was 
more straightforward in the politics surrounding the adoption of the 
Sixteenth Amendment a century ago. In fact, Southerners and Westerners 
demanded the adoption of the federal income tax for the obvious reason 
that it would benefit their constituents. By exempting income taxation from 
the apportionment rule that the Constitution specifies for “direct taxes,” the 
Sixteenth Amendment allowed Congress to tax in proportion to the 
distribution of income rather than the distribution of population. Because of 
the lopsided geographical distribution of income at the time, this procedure 
generated lopsided contributions from the high-income states of the 
Northeast, particularly New York. Yet some Southerners also thought the 
income tax was potentially dangerous because it would strengthen the 
federal government, with results that could potentially threaten their 
oppression of African Americans (disfranchisement, segregation, and 
rampant lynching). White Southerners worried about the safety of white 
supremacy in their debates with each other about whether to ratify the 
Sixteenth Amendment. In the end, however, they ratified enthusiastically, 
not only because they knew that their states would benefit, but also because 
they believed, correctly, that Northerners had lost interest in attempting to 
protect the rights of African Americans. Thus, this milestone in the history 
of taxation exemplified the irony of the Progressive Era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are probably all familiar with one of the most striking ironies in 
American tax politics: that the places where the anti-tax and anti-spending 
appeals of conservative Republicans resonate most strongly, which are 
closely associated with a more general hostility to the federal government, 
are the places that actually benefit most from federal taxing and spending. 
Over the past few years, maps illustrating this relationship have circulated 
widely on the Internet,1 the point being that they resemble the familiar 
election maps that distinguish the Republican “red states” and Democratic 
“blue states,”2 though with a logic that defies partisan political rhetoric—
particularly Republican partisan rhetoric.3 Generally, the more heavily 
Democratic states have been subsidizing the more heavily Republican 
states, even while the beneficiaries of this transfer have protested ever more 
urgently against the oppressive weight of “big government.”4 
  
 
1 See, e.g., Ezra Klein, The Red State Ripoff, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2010), http://voices.washington
post.com/ezra-klein/2010/04/the_red_state_ripoff.html. Most such maps rely on data from the Tax 
Foundation. For an example of data relied on, see Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending Received by 
State, 1981–2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2007), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-taxes-paid-vs-
federal-spending-received-state-1981-2005. 
2 See Klein, supra note 1. 
3 As stated in the 2012 Republican platform: “Taxes, by their very nature, reduce a citizen’s 
freedom. Their proper role in a free society should be to fund services that are essential and authorized 
by the Constitution, such as national security, and the care of those who cannot care for themselves. We 
reject the use of taxation to redistribute income, fund unnecessary or ineffective programs, or foster the 
crony capitalism that corrupts both politicians and corporations.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, 
WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2 (2012), http://www.gop.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf (emphasis added). 
4 America’s Fiscal Union: The Red and the Black, ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2011, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21525210, also distinguishes the states that have been net gainers from 
federal taxing and spending from those that have been net losers, but it is unique in using its own data, 
presenting the taxing and spending figures as percentages of GDP, and treating the 20-year period from 
1990 to 2009 as a whole. The resulting pattern of net gainers and losers does not map perfectly onto the 
political categories (the “red” Texas, Georgia, and Arkansas are net payers; the “blue” Maryland, 
Vermont, and Oregon are net beneficiaries). Nor is it clear how The Economist defined the key 
variables. Still, the general pattern in this map—states that tend to vote Democratic subsidizing states 
that tend to vote Republican—resembles renderings based on the more standard Tax Foundation data. 
See supra note 1. 
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MAP 1: FEDERAL SPENDING PER DOLLAR OF FEDERAL TAXES, 20055 
 
Map 1 presents federal taxing and spending in the states for 2005, 
using data from the Tax Foundation.6 States in the darkest shade got back 
in federal spending less than 80% of what they paid in federal taxes, states 
in the lightest shade got back more than 120% of what they paid, and the 
other states hovered around the middle. The pattern is clear enough: the 
most heavily Democratic states generally were heavy net payers; the most 
heavily Republican states generally were heavy net beneficiaries. Put 
another way, the Democratic “blue states” subsidized the Republican “red 
states.” The map contains only two serious outliers: Maryland and Hawaii 
were politically “blue” states7 that enjoyed 130% and 144% of their federal 
tax burdens for obvious reasons (for example, proximity to Washington, 
D.C., and military spending).8 Nevada and New Hampshire, meanwhile, 
 
5 Map 1 is based on data from the Tax Foundation. See Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending 
Received by State, 1981–2005, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
7 2008 General Election Voter Registration Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elec
tions.gmu.edu/Registration_2008G.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2009). 
8 See FED. FACILITIES ADVISORY BD. & MD. DEP’T OF BUS. & ECON. DEV., 2010: THE EFFECT OF 
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND SPENDING IN MARYLAND, at ii (2012), available at http://www.choose
maryland.org/aboutdbed/Documents/Boards/FFAB%20Federal%20Impact%20Report.pdf; 
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both register among the major net payers, but have been “swing” states in 
recent elections.9 Nevertheless, although the relationship is far from 
perfect, it is more than merely suggestive.10 
MAP 2: NONTAXPAYERS IN 2008: PERCENTAGE OF INCOME TAX FILERS WITH  
NO TAX LIABILITY11 
  
 
JAMES HOSEK, AVIVA LITOVITZ & ADAM C. RESNICK, RAND CORP., HOW MUCH DOES MILITARY 
SPENDING ADD TO HAWAII’S ECONOMY? at xii (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR996.pdf. 
9 See Chris Cillizza, The 9 Swing States of 2012, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:51 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/the-9-swing-states-of-2012/2012/04/16/gIQABu
XaLT_blog.html. 
10 I correlated the spending-to-tax burden ratio of 2005 with returns from the 2004 presidential 
election, producing a correlation coefficient of 0.43 (significant at 0.01) and an R2 of 0.187. For the 
2004 election returns, see Election of 2004, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/showelection.php? year=2004 (last visited June 5, 2014). 
11 Map 2 is based on data and a map generated by the Tax Foundation. See Scott A. Hodge, States 
Vary Widely in Number of Tax Filers with No Income Tax Liability: Southern States Have Highest 
Percentages of “Nonpayers,” TAX FOUND. FISCAL FACT, May 24, 2010, at 1, http://taxfoundation.org/
sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff229.pdf. The map produced here does not contain the state rankings 
reflected on the Tax Foundation map. See id. 
108:773 (2014) The South and the Federal Income Tax 
777 
For another striking illustration, consider the percentage of income tax 
filers with a zero or negative tax liability. Map 2 resembles a map that the 
Tax Foundation posted online in 2010 using 2008 data, drawn to highlight 
the states in which the highest and lowest percentages of the income tax 
filers ended up with a zero or negative tax liability.12 On Map 2, the ten 
states in the darkest shade had the highest percentages of filers with no tax 
liability, while the ten states in the lighter gray had the lowest percentages 
of zero or negative liability. The most obvious feature of this map, of 
course, is the dominance of the heavily “nonpaying” category by the 
Southern states. The Tax Foundation’s version of Map 2 included state 
rankings that further dramatized the role of the South, locating numbers 
one through nine in the continuous belt from South Carolina to New 
Mexico (Idaho clocked in at number ten).13 The “nonpayer” map drew 
attention during the 2012 presidential campaign after Mitt Romney’s 
remark about the 47% of Americans “who believe the government has a 
responsibility to care for them, . . . that they are entitled to health care, to 
food, to housing, to you-name-it,” and, in addition, that they “are people 
who pay no income tax.”14 Leaving aside the fact that paying no income tax 
is not the same thing as paying no taxes—even most of those who pay no 
income tax still pay the regressive sales, excise, and payroll taxes15—the 
point of citing the “nonpayer” map during the election campaign was the 
ironic expectation that Mitt Romney actually would win the states where 
the largest proportions of filers were nonpayers. And, conversely, that 
except in Alaska, Wyoming, and North Dakota (sparsely populated 




14 Lucy Madison, Fact-Checking Romney’s “47 Percent” Comment, CBS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012, 
11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57515033-503544/fact-checking-romneys-47-
percent-comment/. For attention to the Tax Foundation map during the campaign, see, for example, 
Samuel Goldman, Where Do the 47 Percent Live?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 17, 2012, 9:04 PM), 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/where-do-the-47-percent-live/. Others cited data from the 
Tax Policy Center. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Donald B. Marron, 5 Myths About the 47 Percent, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2012, at B2 (citing “[o]ur colleagues at the Tax Policy Center”); Allison Linn, 
The 47 Percent: Here’s Who Pays No Federal Income Tax, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:13 AM), 
http://economywatch.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/18/13939069-the-47-percent-heres-who-pays-no-
federal-income-tax?lite (citing the Tax Policy Center’s July 2011 report). For the Tax Policy Center 
data relied on, see, for example, Table T11-0173: Tax Units with Zero or Negative Tax Liability, 2004–
2011, TAX POL’Y CENTER (June 14, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T11-
0173.pdf, and Rachel Johnson et al., Why Some Tax Units Pay No Income Tax, TAX POL’Y CENTER 
(July 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001547-Why-No-Income-Tax.pdf. Some 
commentators cited both datasets. See, e.g., Richard Florida, The Geography of the 47%, ATLANTIC 
CITIES (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/09/geography-47/33
23/; Madison, supra; Kevin Roose, Who, Exactly, Are the 47 Percent?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 17, 2012, 
6:03 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/09/who-exactly-are-the-47-percent.html. 
15 Gale & Marron, supra note 14. 
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filers were nonpayers.16 Without the double negative, President Obama 
would win (and did win17) in the states where the most income tax filers 
were also income tax payers. In response to the publicity, the Tax 
Foundation updated its filer–payer map with 2010 data.18 Again, the South 
dominated the ranks of the heavily “nonpaying” states, as Table 1 shows. 
This time, Utah joined Idaho (and New Mexico) among the nonpaying 
leaders, but the Southern states retained their dominance of the category. 
  
 
16 See Mitt Romney Says Voters Who Support Barack Obama Are “People Who Pay No Income 
Tax,” TAMPA BAY TIMES POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/sep/18
/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-says-voters-who-support-barack-obama-a/ (last visited June 4, 2014) (“The 
[Tax Foundation] tallied the states that had the highest percentages of non-income-tax-paying residents. 
The 10 states with the highest rates of non-tax-payers are mostly ones that Romney has in the bag—
Texas, Idaho, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. And several 
states with the lowest rates are solidly in Obama’s camp, including Minnesota, Maryland and 
Massachusetts.”). 
17 2012 Presidential Election Results, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
special/politics/election-map-2012/president/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012). 
18 See Nick Kasprak, Monday Map: Nonpayers by State, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 24, 2012), http://tax
foundation.org/blog/monday-map-nonpayers-state. 
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Mississippi 1 44.5 
Georgia 2 42.5 
Alabama 3 40.3 
Florida 4 39.0 
Arkansas 5 38.8 
South Carolina 6 38.8 
New Mexico 7 38.7 
Idaho 8 38.6 
Texas 9 38.5 
Utah 10 38.3 
Ten Lowest 
Rank “Nonpayers” 
New Jersey 41 29.2 
Minnesota 42 29.2 
Washington 43 29.0 
Wyoming 44 28.6 
Maryland 45 28.2 
Connecticut 46 26.6 
Massachusetts 47 26.3 
New Hampshire 48 26.3 
North Dakota 49 26.3 
Alaska 50 22.0 
  
 
19 Table 1 is based on data from the Tax Foundation. Id. 
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And that Southern role is the point of this Article. Particularly since 
World War II, the federal income tax has played a key role in enabling the 
federal government to redistribute the nation’s resources in a southward 
direction.20 The tax has changed in many ways and performed many 
functions over the century of its use, but aside from a slow start in its first 
two decades,21 a significant and largely unheralded constant has been the 
role of the income tax in enabling the federal budget to operate as a mighty 
engine of geographical redistribution.22 Armed with the power to collect 
this lucrative tax by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,23 
the federal government has raised its revenues disproportionately in the 
North and distributed its spending disproportionately in the South. 
Strikingly, the tax side of this history has gone all but unremarked in the 
literature. The outline of the spending story is much more familiar: the 
huge role that federal spending played in promoting the transformation of 
the South “from cotton belt to sunbelt,”24 starting slowly in the 1930s (with, 
for example, rural electrification), accelerating rapidly during World War II 
(military bases, weapons contracts), and then ratcheting upward again after 
1970.25 The Social Security and Medicare benefits of migrating retirees 
have enhanced the pattern more recently, along with disproportionate 
spending on poverty programs in the South.26 
  
 
20 BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON BELT TO SUNBELT: FEDERAL POLICY, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH, 1938–1980, at 132–34 (1994); GAVIN 
WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 
259–61 (1986). 
21 See DAVID L. CARLTON & PETER A. COCLANIS, THE SOUTH, THE NATION, AND THE WORLD: 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTHERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2003). 
22 For exposés of recent North-to-South redistribution, see, for example, Dave Gilson, Most Red 
States Take More Money from Washington than They Put in, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 16, 2012, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/states-federal-taxes-spending-charts-maps, which notes,  
“Most politically ‘red’ states are financially in the red when it comes to how much money they receive 
from Washington compared with what their residents pay in taxes.” Longer term historical studies 
include: KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & ROURKE L. O’BRIEN, TAXING THE POOR: DOING DAMAGE TO THE 
TRULY DISADVANTAGED (2011); SCHULMAN, supra note 20; and WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 257–64. 
For a view dating the crucial takeoff in Southern defense spending to the years after 1990, see 
CARLTON & COCLANIS, supra note 21, at 151–62, which notes, “[S]ince 1989 the South’s share of 
procurement spending has surged from 78 to 115 percent of its share of U.S. population, and from 87 to 
126 percent of its share of U.S. personal income.” 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration.”). 
24 See SCHULMAN, supra note 20. 
25 See id. at 139–51. 
26 See NEWMAN & O’BRIEN, supra note 22, at 140–42. 
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MAP 3: FEDERAL INCOME TAX PER CAPITA, 1916 (PERSONAL AND CORPORATION)27 
  
MAP 4: FEDERAL TAX BURDEN PER CAPITA, 200528
 
27 TREASURY DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 65-1169, at 12–13 (1918) [hereinafter STATISTICS OF INCOME]; BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, ESTIMATED POPULATION FOR DRAFT APPORTIONMENT, S. DOC. NO. 65-64, at 28 (1917) 
[hereinafter ESTIMATES OF POPULATION]. 
28 Map 4 is based upon data from the Tax Foundation. Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Spending 
Received by State, 1981–2005, supra note 1. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
This Article presents preliminary results of research intended to 
remedy the neglect of the tax side of this story. We can start with a rough 
century-crossing comparison of 1916 and 2005. The continuities between 
Map 3 and Map 4 are unmistakable. Both maps display the states with the 
highest and lowest per capita federal tax burdens. In both, the highest taxes 
were paid in the North and the lowest taxes were paid in the South. There 
have, of course, been some significant changes over the century separating 
these statistical snapshots: Oklahoma was one of the richest states in the 
heyday of its oil boom in 1916,29 while the West Coast in general (and 
California in particular) still had tremendous growth in its future. Nor do 
the two maps present exactly comparable data: Map 3 is the sum of 
individual and corporation income taxes in 1916,30 while Map 4 is all 
federal taxes in 2005.31 Nevertheless, New York, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut remain among the ten states with the 
highest per capita burdens across the century separating 1916 and 2005, 
while South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas remain among 
the ten states with the lowest per capita burdens. This continuity may be 
unsurprising in itself, since much of the South has generally been 
notoriously poor, but it masks a less familiar reversal in the rhetoric of 
Southern politics. Today, it can seem a paradox, at best, that the federal 
government redistributes from the states where majorities are tolerant of 
federal taxation toward the states where they are unremittingly hostile. A 
century ago, however, the rhetoric was more straightforward. Southern 
politicians demanded the adoption of the federal income tax because they 
knew that it would benefit their constituents. 
 
29 Taxpayers who listed their occupations as mine owners or operators (“mines” included oil wells) 
paid 88% of Oklahoma’s income tax in 1916. STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 110. 
30 See supra note 27. 
31 See supra note 28. 
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MAP 5: PERSONAL INCOME TAX PER CAPITA, 191632 
Map 5 offers another take on the 1916 data. Concentrating only on the 
personal income tax (rather than combining it with the corporation tax), 
this map shows the per capita burdens for all of the states. Those in the 
darkest color paid an average of more than one dollar per capita; those in 
the lightest paid an average of less than 25 cents.33 This is the key map for 
this Article, and its features can be further emphasized by a statistic. In 
1916, the first year of published income tax statistics, New York State paid 
a stunning 45% of the proceeds of the personal income tax.34 Pennsylvania 
came in second, paying 10%, and Illinois third at 6%.35 This result was the 
point of the Sixteenth Amendment: by exempting income taxation from the 
apportionment rule that the Constitution specifies for “direct taxes,” the 
Amendment allowed Congress to levy its taxes in proportion to the 
distribution of income rather than the distribution of population.36 More 
specifically, in regard to New York, the amendment allowed Congress to 
pull 45% of the income tax from a state with only 11% of the population.37 
 
32 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27. 
33 See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, 
supra note 27, at 24. 
34 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19. 
35 Id. at 18–19. Massachusetts came close behind in fourth. Id. 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (amending id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which required Congress to levy taxes in 
proportion to the census); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing the apportionment of direct taxes). 
37 See STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at 
28. In Pollock, of course, the Supreme Court had ruled that the income tax was a “direct tax” and 
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In per capita terms, Delaware was actually the most extreme case. New 
Yorkers paid an average of seven dollars per capita in personal income 
taxes in 1916, but the residents of Delaware (with a wealthy elite but a very 
small overall population) paid an average over twice that figure.38 But I 
really want to draw your attention to the South: the 6 cents per capita in 
South Carolina, 9 cents in Alabama, 10 cents in Arkansas, 13 cents in 
Mississippi, and 15 cents in Georgia.39 Outside the South, only the 
relatively undeveloped Dakotas and Nevada registered comparably low 
income tax burdens.40 
Historians of the income tax have barely remarked on this sectional 
phenomenon.41 The classic narratives of the origin of the income tax, from 
the abortive 1894 tax voided in Pollock42 to the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913,43 explain the story in class terms or, when they notice 
sectional dynamics, describe a combined West and South battling against 
the Northeast, with “Northeast” understood essentially as a synonym for 
industrial and financial capital.44 The most widely cited version, Sidney 
Ratner’s American Taxation—with its cringe-worthy subtitle, Its History as 
a Social Force in Democracy—was published in 1942.45 Ratner emphasizes 
liberals and conservatives in an anachronistic New Deal idiom.46 Tax 
 
therefore had to be apportioned by population. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 
573–74, 582–83, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
38 See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, 
supra note 27, at 28. 
39 See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, 
supra note 27, at 28. 
40 See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, 
supra note 27, at 28. I am mapping only the states, but the data also includes Washington, D.C., and the 
territories of Alaska and Hawaii. The per capita figures were high in D.C. ($3.08) and Hawaii ($1.67), 
and low in Alaska ($0.26). See supra Map 5; STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; 
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at 28. 
41 ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 
1877–1917 (1999), is unique in emphasizing Southern support for the income tax in a major 
reinterpretation of Progressivism, id. at 223–24 (“The southern periphery–insurgent alliance also 
attempted to insert an income-tax amendment in the Aldrich bill.”), though Sanders mutes the point by 
folding the South into a larger “agrarian” Southern and Western “periphery” defined by reliance on 
“one or two cash crops produced for national and international (as opposed to local) markets.” Id. at 28. 
MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE PARADOX OF POVERTY 
125–47 (2012), emphasizes Southern support for progressive income taxation in the 1920s and 1930s. 
42 See supra note 37. 
43 See RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENTS BY THE STATES, S. DOC. NO. 71-
240, at 10–11 (1931). 
44 Sanders illustrates this usage: “[T]he dynamic stimulus for Populist and Progressive Era state 
expansion was the periphery agrarians’ drive to establish public control over a rampaging capitalism.” 
SANDERS, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
45 SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 
(1942). 
46 See id. at 13–17, 307. 
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conflicts, according to Ratner, pitted the “common people” against the 
“plutocrats,” farmers and workers against industrialists and financiers, and, 
of course, the West and South versus the Northeast.47 Ratner describes pro-
tax speeches as interesting and enlightened and anti-tax speeches, such as 
those from the “pro-capitalistic New York delegation[],” as unrelentingly 
hidebound and self-interested.48 Ratner’s biases are understandable and, at 
this late date, should also be forgivable. Ratner was a New Dealer through 
and through; in 1935, he published an article anticipating FDR’s plan to 
“pack” the Supreme Court by claiming that Grant did the same thing in 
1870.49 Yet Ratner occasionally had to squirm to make his case about New 
Deal-style class struggle. A good example is his treatment of Joseph W. 
Bailey, Texas Democrat and champion of the income tax in the Senate for 
over a decade.50 After admitting that Bailey acted as a tool of Standard 
Oil,51 Ratner suggested that Bailey’s advocacy of the egalitarian tax policy 
might have stemmed from a “guilt complex.”52 
Ratner’s gloss on Bailey is unique, but his analysis of the politics of 
the income tax resembled those of his contemporaries, Roy and Gladys 
Blakey53 and Randolph Paul,54 as well as the more recent journalistic 
rendition by New York Times reporter Steven Weisman.55 This story—
about liberals versus conservatives, ordinary people versus plutocrats, and 
the West and South versus the Northeast—has survived in part because few 
historians have shown a great deal of interest in either the income tax 
specifically or tax history more generally.56 Robert Stanley has offered a 
 
47 See id. at 175–89, 219, 276; see also PRASAD, supra note 41, at 125–28. 
48 RATNER, supra note 45, at 176–78. 
49 See Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 343 
(1935). 
50 RATNER, supra note 45, at 280–82. 
51 See id. at 281. C. Vann Woodward, the renowned Southern historian, would say the same thing a 
decade later. See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913, in 9 A HISTORY OF THE 
SOUTH 385 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). 
52 RATNER, supra note 45, at 282. Elizabeth Sanders describes Bailey as conservative on state 
issues within Texas but as “a faithful representative of his state’s progressive economic inclinations” on 
national issues. SANDERS, supra note 41, at 200. 
53 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1–103 (1940). 
54 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954). 
55 STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 133–45 (2002). 
56 In particular, nobody has unpacked the geographical unit of “West and South” with reference to 
the income tax. Elizabeth Sanders argues for its coherence on the basis of economic policy interests—as 
the location of “peripheral agrarians”—though she notes that Westerners and Southerners disagreed 
about the tariff, with Westerners supporting it and Southerners opposing it. SANDERS, supra note 41, at 
3–4, 160–61. Yet even while the West and South clearly shared many economic interests in opposition 
to the Northeast, they entered the twentieth century with very different relationships to the Northeast as 
a result of the legacies of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. Western politicians did not have 
to worry about Northeastern interference with their racial politics, since they faced relatively little 
resistance on the racial issues they cared about: wresting land from Native Americans and excluding 
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starkly revisionist view by portraying the early income taxes as fig leaves 
that elites deployed as political cover for their much larger system of 
regressive taxes on consumption financing subsidies for powerful business 
elites.57 Ajay Mehrotra emphasizes intellectual history, especially growing 
support for the income tax among lawyers and economists at both the state 
and national levels.58 Bennett Baack and Edward Ray, meanwhile, present a 
statistical linkage between the states that favored the income tax and those 
benefiting from military and veteran’s pension spending.59 This connection, 
they argue, explains the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment that ushered 
the United States into what they call “the modern age of special-interest 
politics.”60 
The most influential recent account of the origins of the income tax, 
Elliot Brownlee’s overview in Federal Taxation in America, updates the 
traditional story.61 Brownlee drops the anachronistic categories—the 
liberals, conservatives, common people, and plutocrats—but posits a 
regime change the earlier scholars would have recognized: from the 
nineteenth-century consumption tax regime of regressive tariffs and excises 
to what Brownlee dubs the “democratic statism” of the twentieth century.62 
By “democratic statism,” Brownlee means taxes designed to redistribute 
income in an egalitarian direction rather than merely to raise money.63 The 
champions of income taxation wanted progressive rates aimed at the rich to 
 
Asian immigrants from the United States. See generally ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE 
LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S 
YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN”: A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1991). 
Southern whites, in contrast, had not only experienced Reconstruction, but also knew that many 
Northern Republicans continued to harbor hopes of defending the rights of Southern blacks until the 
early twentieth century. See generally CHARLES W. CALHOUN, CONCEIVING A NEW REPUBLIC: THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE SOUTHERN QUESTION, 1869–1900 (2006); STANLEY P. HIRSHSON, 
FAREWELL TO THE BLOODY SHIRT: NORTHERN REPUBLICANS & THE SOUTHERN NEGRO, 1877–1893 
(1962). 
57 See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 16–17 (1993). 
58 See, e.g., AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 409–11 (2013); Ajay K. Mehrotra, 
Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual 
Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1863–66 (2005); Ajay K. Mehrotra, The 
Intellectual Foundations of the Modern American Fiscal State, 138 DÆDALUS 53, 53–54, 60 (2009). 
59 Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in 
the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 607, 619–20, 624 (1985). Baack and Ray present only statistical 
evidence, without any evidence of articulated intentions. 
60 Id. at 624. 
61 W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed. 2004). 
62 Id. at 44–45. 
63 Democratic statists “designed their tax program to restructure the market-driven machinery for 
distributing income and wealth.” Id. at 45. 
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redress what they saw as the severe maldistribution of income and wealth 
in the age of robber barons and monopolistic trusts. “Those who believed 
they had faced expropriation,” Brownlee explains, “would now do the 
expropriating.”64 
Like the earlier historians, Brownlee acknowledges that the idea of 
using federal taxation for purposes other than revenue raising was not an 
innovation of “democratic statism,” much less of the income tax.65 The 
tariffs of the consumption tax regime had always been framed chiefly to 
implement a public policy: protectionism to stimulate (or at least subsidize) 
American industries. Tariff politics had always been mainly about the 
redistributive effects of protectionism, though it also involved logrolling 
and party-building strategies. From the days of Jefferson and Hamilton 
through the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s, the Walker and Morrill tariffs, 
the post-Civil War establishment of massive protectionism as Republican 
doctrine, and then the truly dreary series of tariffs that echoed the election 
returns—the Mongrel, McKinley, Wilson–Gorman, Dingley, Payne–
Aldrich, Underwood, Fordney–McCumber, and Smoot–Hawley tariffs—
the design of the tariff schedules never hinged more than incidentally on 
the customs receipts.66 Politicians made assorted claims about whether 
revenues would rise or fall, but they cared only to the extent that fiscal 
results could affect the power of protectionist coalitions.67 In any case, as 
the tariff expert Frank Taussig explained at the end of the nineteenth 
century, such revenue projections rested “simply on guesswork.”68 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 40–43. 
66 See EDWARD STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(1903); F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1899). Most tariff scholars stress the dominance of protection over revenue concerns in tariff 
debates. See, e.g., PHILLIP W. MAGNESS, FROM TARIFFS TO THE INCOME TAX: TRADE PROTECTION AND 
REVENUE IN THE UNITED STATES TAX SYSTEM 354–55 (2009); JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF 
QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE 135–37 (1994); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE 
TARIFF 26–27 (1935); TAUSSIG, supra, at 354–58; TOM E. TERRILL, THE TARIFF, POLITICS, AND 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1874–1901, at 9–11, 13 (1973); Douglas A. Irwin, Higher Tariffs, Lower 
Revenues? Analyzing the Fiscal Aspects of “The Great Tariff Debate of 1888,” 58 J. ECON. HIST. 59, 
71 (1998). For the opposing view, emphasizing the centrality of the revenue, see John Mark Hansen, 
Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff, 44 INT’L ORG. 527, 528, 539 (1990). 
67 See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000). For an illustration of the incidental nature of the tariff’s 
revenue impact, note that the federal government ran budget surpluses in every year from 1866 to 1893, 
and often very large surpluses; in 1883 the surplus was half the size of total federal spending. John 
Joseph Wallis, Table Ea584-587: Federal Government Finances—Revenue, Expenditure, and Debt: 
1789–1939, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 5-80 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 
Millennial ed. 2006). Starting in 1869, the tariff produced between around half and two-thirds of federal 
tax revenue in this period. Id.; John Joseph Wallis, Table Ea588-593: Federal Government Revenue, by 
Source: 1978–1939, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 5-82. 
68 TAUSSIG, supra note 66, at 355–56. 
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With the exception of Louisiana sugar interests,69 Southerners had 
generally been staunch opponents of a protectionism they saw as Northern 
robbery: increasing the prices of the things they bought and potentially 
impairing the prices of the things they sold on international markets. 
Indeed, the tariff was itself widely understood as a mighty engine of 
geographical redistribution, whose results were all the more sinister 
because they were hard to measure.70 By the late nineteenth century, the 
“taxes” that the tariff imposed on consumers to subsidize protected 
industries (by letting them charge higher prices) were much higher than the 
revenue the federal government raised from customs receipts.71 These 
subsidies were widely understood not only to be massive (even though they 
never appeared in Treasury accounts as either “taxing” or “spending”), but 
also to be enjoyed mainly by the largest and richest industrial 
corporations.72 Westerners had often agreed with Southerners in criticizing 
this system,73 but, as the political scientist Richard Bensel explains, the 
Republican party managed to forge durable protectionist coalitions across 
the North in the late nineteenth century not only through the traditional 
method (adding protection for Western products to buy Western support for 
the system as a whole), but also by spending the revenue on what 
developed into a gigantic program of Civil War pensions for Union Army 
veterans.74 Needless to say, veterans of the defunct Southern Confederacy 
 
69 See RICHARD FOLLETT, THE SUGAR MASTERS: PLANTERS AND SLAVES IN LOUISIANA’S CANE 
WORLD, 1820–1860, at 27–45 (2005) (on pre-Civil War tariff); JOSEPH SITTERSON, SUGAR COUNTRY: 
THE CANE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE SOUTH, 1753–1950, at 324–42 (1953) (on post-Civil War tariff). 
70 For the antebellum tradition, see WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE 
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at 107 (1968), and BRIAN SCHOEN, 
THE FRAGILE FABRIC OF UNION: COTTON, FEDERAL POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 101–02, 131–32 (2009). 
71 Because these “taxes” could not be measured, estimates of their size varied. In 1888, for 
example, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee suggested that they imposed taxes four 
times higher than the customs receipts. CUSTOMS TARIFFS: SENATE AND HOUSE REPORTS 1888, 1890, 
1894, 1897, S. DOC. NO. 60-547, at 158 (1909). In 1909, the New York Times pegged them at 6.5 times 
the customs receipts. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 53, at 32; Mr. Aldrich’s “Surprise,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 1909, at 6. In fact, however, these estimates were probably too low since they were derived 
from the customs receipts, that is, from the taxes on goods actually imported. Prohibitively high duties, 
which blocked imports of the protected goods, allowed domestic firms to raise their prices without 
raising any revenue for the Treasury. Ways and Means chairman William L. Wilson explained this 
problem in 1893: “As so many of the rates of the present law are really prohibitory, it is impossible to 
say what its real rate of taxation is, but it is safe to affirm that it is much higher than any import tables 
will disclose.” S. DOC. NO. 60-547, at 291. 
72 Hence Democrats routinely describing the tariff as “the mother of trusts,” see, e.g., DEMOCRATIC 
CONG. COMM., DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN BOOK: CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 1906, at 38 (1906), or, in a 
slightly more colorful version from 1888, “the nursing mother of trusts.” S. DOC. NO. 60-547, supra 
note 71, at 127. 
73 See BENSEL, supra note 67, at 8, 464; SANDERS, supra note 41, at 160–61. 
74 See BENSEL, supra note 67, at 462–63. For the vast scope of the veterans pensions, see WILLIAM 
H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 123–270, 275 (David Kinley ed., 
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did not share in this bounty. Thus, the combination of tariffs and pensions 
into what Bensel calls the “tariff policy complex”75 only increased Southern 
hostility to Republican protectionism.76 The tariff burdened Southerners to 
hand ever larger sums of money to Northerners.77 
It is not that historians have failed to notice Southern support for the 
federal income tax, in both its Populist and Progressive incarnations, but 
that they have tended to downplay it.78 There are several good reasons for 
this. First of all, it is hard to tell a story about rising “democracy” in this 
period that casts the South in a leading role. The major developments in 
Southern political history from the 1890s through the 1910s included the 
disfranchisement campaign that denied voting rights to all blacks and many 
poor whites.79 These decades witnessed the establishment of segregation as 
state law,80 famously endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,81 and the heyday of lynching as public terrorism, mainly though 
not only in the South: 3943 lynchings in the South from 1880 to 1930, 
claiming 3220 African-American victims (82% of the total).82 Second, 
Southern poverty—the fact that very few Southerners could expect to pay 
income taxes83—may have rendered their economic interests too 
predictable to be noteworthy. The low Southern per capita averages in Map 
5 can be supplemented by striking statistics. As a region, the South’s 25.9% 
of the population filed 12.7% of the personal income tax returns in 1916, 
reported 10% of the income, and paid 7.6% of the tax.84 The reality was 
actually even more extreme, since Delaware and Maryland alone accounted 
for 28% of the region’s income and 46% of its personal income tax 
 
1918), describing “the great liberality of the provisions made by general pension legislation for the 
soldiers of the Civil War and their dependent relatives,” and THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS 
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 102–03, 107–09 
(1992). 
75 BENSEL, supra note 67, at xiii–xix, 494–506. 
76 See id. at 487–88. 
77 See supra note 66. 
78 See, e.g., BROWNLEE, supra note 61; RATNER, supra note 45. 
79 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 6–8 (1974); MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE 
FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908, at 1, 10–12 (2001). 
80 WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 211–12, 350–52. 
81 165 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). 
82 W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, Introduction to UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE 
SOUTH 4 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997). More generally and from a large literature, see, for 
example, DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK 
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2012). 
83 See supra Map 5 (providing the personal income tax per capita in 1916). 
84 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at 
28. 
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payments.85 For historians of the income tax, moreover, the traditional 
Southern hostility to the tariff would have made Southern support for the 
income tax even more predictable, particularly to the extent that it was 
expected to do what it ultimately did do: replace the tariff as the principal 
source of federal revenue.86 Yet there is also an irony here. Southern 
critiques of the tariff had often sounded like arguments against federal 
taxation more generally. For decades, Southerners had been claiming that 
the tariff, which was the only federal tax from 1817 until the outbreak of 
the Civil War,87 constituted a dangerous increase in federal power.88 The 
argument that a far more intrusive federal income tax could solve that 
problem is at least noteworthy. 
Historians have also had good reasons to emphasize developments in 
other regions. The big political story of the congressional session that sent 
the amendment to the states in 1909 had nothing to do with the South. It 
was a struggle between Regular and Insurgent Republicans, with the 
Insurgents hailing mainly from the Northwest.89 This struggle split the 
Republican party, led to major Democratic gains across the North in 1910 
and 1912, and, in the four-way presidential race of 1912, ushered Woodrow 
Wilson into the White House as the second Democrat and first Southerner 
since the Civil War.90 As John Buenker has shown in a detailed study, the 
Sixteenth Amendment could not have won ratification without support in 
the Northeast—and it could not have won that support without Democratic 
landslides in 1910 and 1912.91 We can use the House of Representatives as 
a quick measure of these landslides. In the 61st Congress (elected in 1908), 
Democrats held only 20% of the seats from the Northeast; in the 62nd 
(1910), they held more than 40%, and in the 63rd (1912) they held almost 
 
85 STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 27, at 18–19; ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, supra note 27, at 
28. 
86 See John Joseph Wallis, Table EA594-608 Federal Government Internal Tax Revenue, by 
Source: 1863–1940, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 67, at 5-85; John 
Joseph Wallis, Table Ea588-593 Federal Government Revenue, by Source: 1789–1939, in HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 67, at 5-82. 
87 ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 111 (2006). 
88 The Nullification Crisis was only the most obvious occasion for Southern anti-tariff hostility. See 
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE 
NULLIFICATION CRISIS 7–9 (1987); FREEHLING, supra note 70, at 25 (“There was nothing more 
commonplace in pre-Civil War America than a southern crusade against high protective tariffs.”). 
Overtly protectionist policymaking is usually dated to the 1816 tariff, but Southerners opposed even its 
earliest incarnation in 1789. See TAUSSIG, supra note 66, at 68. 
89 See DAVID P. THELEN, ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE AND THE INSURGENT SPIRIT 52–98 (1976); 
David Sarasohn, The Insurgent Republicans: Insurgent Image and Republican Reality, 3 SOC. SCI. 
HIST. 245 (1979). 
90 THELEN, supra note 89. 
91 See JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 239–49 (1985). 
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60%.92 Democrats also made big gains in the Midwest (30% to 50% to 
60%) and West (20% to nearly 30% to over 40%). In the South, the 
Democrats had little growing room (from 85% in 1908 to a bit over 90% in 
1910, then a bit under 90% in 1912), though the seniority the Southern 
members had accrued by the time their new Northern colleagues arrived 
meant big boosts to their power.93 
The Northern electoral drama was part of the larger phenomenon 
known as Progressivism. Historians have debated for generations about 
how to describe the Progressive movement. These debates have hinged on 
class, ethnicity, gender, urbanization, professionalization, religion, and 
more, but they rarely so much as mention the federal income tax.94 This 
Article is not the place to offer yet another new interpretation of 
Progressivism in the North, but the income tax can help us make sense of 
the Southern role in the national story. Southern historians usually describe 
a pale reflection of the North’s Progressive movement. C. Vann Woodward 
famously called his chapter on the subject Progressivism—for Whites 
Only,95 which J. Morgan Kousser, studying education in North Carolina, 
qualified further to Progressivism—for Middle-Class Whites Only.96 Dewey 
Grantham’s modest title, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of 
Progress and Tradition, makes the same point.97 
Yet if we treat the income tax the way that most tax historians have, as 
a major milestone of egalitarian Progressivism,98 then the South must 
belong in the vanguard of the movement. Southerners also supported other 
policies intended to strengthen farmers against Northern big business: 
antitrust, rural credit, agricultural warehousing, highway subsidies, and, of 
 
92 Calculated from KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1789–1989, at 162–67 (1989). 
93 Id. On seniority and the power of Southern Democrats in Congress, see, for example, V.O. KEY, 
JR., WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ALEXANDER HEARD, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 667 
(1949); MICHAEL PERMAN, THE SOUTHERN POLITICAL TRADITION 71–73 (2012); DAVID M. POTTER, 
THE SOUTH AND THE CONCURRENT MAJORITY 22–23, 31, 37–40 (Don E. Fehrenbacher & Carl N. 
Degler eds., 1972). 
94 For the canonical review of the literature until about 1980, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of 
Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). For highlights of more recent work from various 
perspectives, see ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN REFORM, 1890–1935 
(1991); ERIC RAUCHWAY, BLESSED AMONG NATIONS: HOW THE WORLD MADE AMERICA (2006); 
DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); 
SANDERS, supra note 41; and SKOCPOL, supra note 76. 
95 WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 369. 
96 J. Morgan Kousser, Progressivism—for Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina Education, 
1880–1910, 46 J. S. HIST. 169 (1980). 
97 DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, SOUTHERN PROGRESSIVISM: THE RECONCILIATION OF PROGRESS AND 
TRADITION (1983). 
98 See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 45. 
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course, lower tariffs,99 though there were limits. George Tindall illustrates 
these limits by quoting a frustrated Southern child labor advocate: “We 
believe in investigating the New York insurance companies and even the 
railroads,” but Southerners are never willing “to appoint an inspector to 
look into conditions in our mill villages” because they believe that “most of 
the bad rich live next to Wall Street, and certainly north of the Mason and 
Dixon line.”100 The erasure of class-based oppression within the South, 
however, is obviously not the main problem with identifying white 
Southern politicians as egalitarian trailblazers. The real problem is that the 
period we still often call the Progressive Era was the heyday of 
disfranchisement, segregation, and lynching.101 This fact offers crucial 
context to the Southern ratification debates. 
II. THE SOLUTION 
Only Southerners treated the Sixteenth Amendment mainly as a states’ 
rights problem. Buenker attributes Virginia’s failure to ratify to the 
subservience of its ruling political machine to Northern business interests, 
but the 1910 debate in the state House of Delegates actually focused 
elsewhere.102 Opponents in Virginia said the same thing over and over: that 
the income tax would dangerously strengthen the federal government. One 
legislator urged Virginia not to “surrender to imperialism,” to a tax that 
“would bring the Federal government for the first time into the lives of 
ordinary citizens in the everyday affairs of life.”103 A self-described 
“humble survivor of the ‘Lost Cause’” appealed to the “sons of the men 
who followed Lee” to “[s]tand by what your fathers fought for.”104 Another 
delegate recalled Reconstruction, when “the North had sent satraps to the 
South to enter every home and go to every crossroads after the Civil 
War.”105 Then, there was the worst threat of all: “Perhaps at some time a 
South-hating man might be President, and negroes might fill these 
positions,” creating the danger of “a negro entering his home and assessing 
 
99 SANDERS, supra note 41. 
100 10 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1913–1945, at 6–7 
(Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1967). 
101 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
102 See BUENKER, supra note 91, at 198–200, 230–34; Buenker also suggests that the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, “the machine’s leading organ,” disapproved due to its “strong states rights objections,” 
id. at 231–32; but it actually endorsed the amendment in an editorial on January 19, 1910, urging 
against states rights fears: “[T]here is no need at present to conjure up terrifying perversions of a power 
which is in itself a proper attribute of the central government.” The Income Tax, TIMES-DISPATCH 
(Richmond), Jan. 19, 1910, at 6. 
103 Virginia Rejects Income Tax Bill, TIMES-DISPATCH (Richmond), Mar. 8, 1910, at 1 (describing 
Virginia House Speaker Richard E. Byrd’s statement in the House). 
104 Id. (statement of Mr. Stubbs). 
105 Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Taliaferro). 
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the incomes from the sale of eggs and butter.”106 The supporters of 
ratification took these objections very seriously. One “hoped that the 
prejudices of war times had passed away”107 and another advised Virginians 
not to be “frightened by the bugaboo of the reconstruction period.”108 Most 
of the supporters emphasized their obligations as Democrats to follow their 
party’s endorsement and the fact that Virginia would benefit from a tax that 
“discriminates only in favor of the poor.”109 The real issue, as another 
explained in frustration, was “whether we continue the burden of the tariff 
or put it elsewhere.”110 “The war is over, and for God’s sake let us not bring 
these things into the practical problems of the day. We must look to the 
future, and not to the past.”111 
For another example, consider Georgia. Supporters of the Amendment 
argued that the income tax would permit Congress to reduce or even 
abolish “the iniquitous high tariff”112 and that “most of the revenue to be 
derived from the income tax will come from north of the Mason and Dixon 
line.”113 One legislator cited Hetty Green, “the richest woman in the world,” 
who currently, without the income tax, “paid no more Federal tax than a 
factory girl,”114 while another predicted, correctly, “that under an income 
tax New York state alone would pay more into the United States treasury 
than all the southern states put together.”115 As in Virginia, Georgia’s 
supporters stressed the Democratic Party’s stand in favor of the 
Amendment, but the Georgia opponents countered by claiming that it was 
really “a Republican trick and clap trap.”116 It was “a Trojan horse,” looking 
like a gift of tariff reduction but actually full of Republican schemes to 
“destroy the last vestige of state’s rights” and increase federal revenues to 
finance “extravagant” spending on such items as road building in the 
Philippines.117 But, of course, extravagance was not the only issue. One 
opponent reminded his colleagues, somewhat enigmatically, that 
 
106 Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Love). 
107 Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Clements). 
108 Id. (describing the statement of Mr. Page). 
109 Id. (describing the statement of Mr. McRae). 
110 Id. (describing the statement of Judge Williams). 
111 Id. (statement of Judge Martin Williams). 
112 See, e.g., Action on Income Tax Improbable, ATLANTA GEORGIAN, Aug. 5, 1909, at 3 
(describing the statement of Mr. Jackson). 
113 Orators Continue Income Tax Debate, ATLANTA GEORGIAN, July 11, 1910, at 16 (recalling the 
statement of Mr. Lovejoy); see Lawyers Offered Thousands to Aid Income Tax Bill?, ATLANTA J., 
July 11, 1910, at 1. 
114 Income Tax Has Center of Stage in Upper Branch, ATLANTA GEORGIAN, July 6, 1910, at 1 
(recalling the statement of Mr. Jackson). 
115 Senate Ratifies Income Tax Bill by 23 to 18 Votes, ATLANTA J., July 11, 1910, at 1. 
116 Senate Carries over Income Tax Amendment, ATLANTA J., July 18, 1910, at 15. 
117 Id.; see also Senate Ratifies Income Tax Bill, supra note 115. 
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“distrusting the Republican party” was a widely shared view in Georgia: 
“The south has received no consideration at their hands, nor will we, until 
they are washed and purified.”118 Others spelled out the nonfiscal issue. 
One combined a complaint that the income tax would hand the federal 
government “uncontrolled power over private citizens” with his doubt that 
Republican administrations “would appoint all white collectors in the 
South.”119 Another opponent made the same racial argument by warning 
“that this state will be filled with Federal tax collectors, white and black, 
asking us all as to our income, looking into our books, querying as to how 
much cotton we made last year, what our income was.”120 Still others 
alluded to race indirectly in the language of federalism, such as the 
legislator who surprised himself by voting yes, “saying he had given some 
years of his life to the fight of the ‘60s for state’s rights and that he never 
thought he would vote for anything like this giving more power to the 
central government” until he had determined to his satisfaction that 
Georgia’s rights were protected.121 The supporters pled with their 
colleagues to recognize “that the Civil War was in the past and that the old 
feeling should be forgotten,”122 that the opponents were cynically 
“inventing the bugaboo of a negro collector,”123 and, strangely, that a 
federal tax on the rich reflected “the principles of southern democracy as 
laid down by Thomas Jefferson.”124 
  
 
118 Senate Ratifies Income Tax Bill, supra note 115. 
119 House Discusses Income Tax Until Time Is Consumed, ATLANTA GEORGIAN, July 6, 1910, at 1 
(describing the statement of Mr. Lawrence). 
120 Income Tax Has Center of Stage in Upper Branch, supra note 114 (statement of Mr. Longley). 
121 State of Georgia Ratifies Income Tax, ATLANTA J., July 12, 1910, at 1. 
122 Income Tax Has Center of Stage in Upper Branch, supra note 114. 
123 Thomas E. Watson, Where Is Hoke?, ATHENS BANNER, July 12, 1910, at 8. 
124 Senate Carries Over Income Tax Amendment, supra note 116. 
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Most Southern legislatures aired these concerns, which a Georgia 
newspaper described as “[s]tate sovereignty, centralization of government 
in Federal hands, and the negro.”126 Nevertheless, only Virginia and Florida 
in the South failed to ratify. Not only did the other Southern states all 
endorse the Amendment, but they led the ratification movement, as Map 6 
shows.127 Seven of the first nine states to ratify had been slave states during 
the Civil War. Alabama was first, followed by Kentucky, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Maryland, Georgia, and Texas. Only Illinois and Oklahoma 
interrupted the string of early Southern ratifications, with Ohio then 
claiming the tenth position.128 Buenker glosses the outcome in the Southern 
states: “In this case, at least, the instinct of the average white Southerner for 
his own self-interest proved strong enough to overcome those who sought 
to appeal to his fears.”129 Put another way, although Southern opponents of 
 
125 The map is based on information from a 1931 Senate document on the ratification of the 
constitutional amendments by state, prepared by the Library of Congress’s Legislative Reference 
Service. RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENTS BY THE STATES, supra note 43. 
126 House Discusses Income Tax Until Time Is Consumed, supra note 119. 
127 See supra Map 6; RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENTS BY THE STATES, 
supra note 43, at 10. 
128 See supra Map 6. 
129 BUENKER, supra note 91, at 238. Southern politicians had waged similar debates with each 
other in the 1880s over the Blair Education Bill, which Congress considered repeatedly but never 
passed. The Blair Bill would have distributed federal school subsidies to the states in proportion to 
illiteracy rates that were much higher in the South than the North. It permitted racial segregation but 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
796 
the income tax evoked their memories of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
the supporters believed that times had changed. 
And they were right. The North in general and Republican Party in 
particular had indeed abandoned their earlier efforts to use federal power to 
protect the rights of African Americans in the South. Many Republicans 
had continued to hope that they could use federal power to protect Southern 
blacks in the 1880s, but the defeat of the Federal Elections Bill or Lodge 
Bill (which Southerners called the Force Bill) in 1890 was a decisive defeat 
for such hopes of interventionist policy.130 Indeed, between this 1890 defeat 
and the 1921 introduction of the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill, which did not 
pass either,131 the South never faced even a remotely serious threat that 
Northerners would try to mobilize the power of the federal government to 
help Southern blacks.132 We have a name for the period from 1890 to 1921: 
the Progressive Era. Historians have noticed the significance of “sectional 
reconciliation” themes in American culture in this era.133 The Sixteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1913, which was also the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Battle of Gettysburg, celebrated at the battlefield by a reunion of over 
50,000 surviving Union and Confederate veterans, together at last as 
Americans.134 Two years later, D.W. Griffiths’ film Birth of a Nation 
dramatized the nation-building appeal of antiblack terror, endorsed by the 
historian in the White House (Woodrow Wilson).135 
The conclusion is inescapable: Southern politicians supported the 
Sixteenth Amendment because they believed that the South would benefit, 
as tax historians have long recognized, but they also, critically, felt secure 
 
required states to spend the money on black children as well as white children and to make annual 
reports on the spending. Most Southern politicians supported the Blair Bill, but they grappled with the 
threat of Northern interference in decisions about how to distribute the funds within their states. See 
SANDERS, supra note 41, at 316 n.5; Daniel W. Crofts, The Black Response to the Blair Education Bill, 
37 J. S. HIST. 41, 42–44 (1971); Allen J. Going, The South and the Blair Education Bill, 44 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 267, 267 (1957); see also Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., North Carolina and Federal 
Aid to Education: Public Reaction to the Blair Bill, 1881–1890, 40 N.C. HIST. REV. 465, 467 (1963) 
(discussing the debate among both the public and politicians in North Carolina over the Blair Bill). A 
North Carolina newspaper even saw a need to assure its readers that the Blair Bill posed no threat of 
Northern curricular supervision—schools forced to teach that “old John Brown was a saint or that Lee 
and Jackson were evil men.” Gatewood, supra, at 481. 
130 See CALHOUN, supra note 56, at 260; HIRSHSON, supra note 56, at 234–36; DAVID W. 
SOUTHERN, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND REFORM, 1900–1917, at 33–34 (2005). 
131 See CHARLES W. CALHOUN, FROM BLOODY SHIRT TO FULL DINNER PAIL 135 (2010); DONALD 
L. GRANT, THE ANTI-LYNCHING MOVEMENT: 1883–1932, at 158–59 (1975). 
132 See supra note 130. 
133 See, e.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 8, 
23, 31, 50, 60 (2001); Michael Rogin, “The Sword Became a Flashing Vision”: D.W. Griffith’s The 
Birth of a Nation, 9 REPRESENTATIONS 150 (1985). 
134 See BLIGHT, supra note 133. 
135 See Rogin, supra note 133, at 151. 
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in supporting it because of a new confidence that increasing the power of 
the federal government would not tempt Northerners to interfere with their 
oppression of African Americans. They did not know quite how much they 
would gain as the federal budget grew over the ensuing decades. Nor did 
they know quite how long Northerners would continue to ignore the 
African-American freedom struggle. They could not have known that the 
New Deal and World War II would pour national (that is, Northern) 
resources into the South while allowing Southern whites to deny the 
benefits to Southern blacks (for example, in Social Security and the G.I. 
Bill).136 Nor could they know that they would enjoy decades of minimal 
Northern pressure on segregation or disfranchisement. But they did know 
one thing: that they were living in the Progressive Era. Hayne had not 
wanted Webster’s railroad in 1830 because it would allow Massachusetts to 
interfere with slavery in South Carolina.137 The Progressive Era was 
different, promising subsidy without interference. Of course Southerners 
seized this new opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixteenth Amendment made it possible for Congress to greatly 
expand the power of the federal government, starting with the financing of 
World War I. Despite its obvious appeal to Southerners on economic 
grounds, their support for the income tax still represents a historical 
problem in the period when white Southerners insisted on the sovereignty 
of the states over the security of white supremacy. The Sixteenth 
Amendment forced Southern politicians to grapple with the traditional 
appeal of “states’ rights” in debates with each other. This Article suggests 
the need to bring our understanding of the origin of the federal income tax 
up to date by taking the racial politics of this period seriously. Arguments 
about “states’ rights” have meant many things in American history but, 
particularly in the South, they have often meant autonomous power to 
oppress African Americans. Because the economic interests of the 
Southern states were so clear, there may well have been little irony in 
Southern support for the Sixteenth Amendment during the Progressive Era. 
This fact, however, does nothing to diminish the retrospective irony in the 
enthusiastic Southern embrace of the federal income tax. 
  
 
136 See KATHLEEN J. FRYDL, THE GI BILL 222–62 (2009); IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
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137 See DANIEL WEBSTER & EDWARD EVERETT, On the South Carolina Canal and Railroad 
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